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 The Differential Impact on Gender Relations of ‘Transformatory’ and 
‘Instrumentalist’  Women’s Group Intermediation in Microfinance Schemes:  




This article starts from conflicting evidence regarding the impact of microfinance 
programs on women’s empowerment. It explores whether schemes that appear to be very 
similar on the surface may actually hide deeper differences that can help explain their 
diverging outcomes. The focus is on group intermediation, a feature that is 
overwhelmingly present in microfinance programs targeted at women. While group 
intermediation clearly has paid off in terms of individual programs’ financial 
profitability, it is also increasingly propagated on equity and empowerment grounds. This 
article argues that it is shortsighted to assume all forms of group intermediation will 
invariably achieve their empowerment potential, and it explores which factors come into 
play in this respect. A basic distinction is made between microfinance programs that use 
women’s groups and existing gender relations as instruments to enhance financial 
sustainability on the one hand and, on the other, programs that rather exploit the capacity 
of credit to mobilize women, to generate and invest in collective action, and to transform 
underlying gender relations. This article draws mainly on insights from (critical) 
institutional and feminist economics and confronts them with empirical evidence from a 
comparative impact study of credit programs in South India that approach women’s 
groups differently.  
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Introduction and overview  
In the last decade, microfinance has been extolled as a panacea for poverty 
alleviation and the enhancement of human well-being. However, the confrontation of 
rhetoric with evidence of effective achievements has somewhat qualified the unbridled 
enthusiasm of the earlier days. While there is a fairly high degree of agreement on the 
effectiveness of microfinance as an instrument for increasing the income of those above 
or on the poverty line, microfinance does not seem to benefit the extremely poor (Mosley, 
2001), who in many cases are apparently not even reached (Navajas et al., 2000). 
Particularly controversial are the effects on women. Although most of the evaluations to 
date relate to the same South Asian context1, some are positive about the empowerment 
potential and supportive of it, while others are skeptical and point at the potential adverse 
effects of microfinance on women2. A closer look at several of these studies suggests that 
such conflicting conclusions may be due to a variety of factors. In her review of 
Bangladeshi impact assessments, Kabeer (2001) indicates that different evaluations do 
not necessarily use the same concept of empowerment; nor do they necessarily measure it 
in the same way. While some focus on changes in individual access to and control over 
resources, others highlight ‘intrahousehold agency’, while still others explore ‘collective 
                                                 
1 Nathalie Holvoet holds a Ph.D. in economics. She is currently a lecturer at the Institute of Development 
Policy and Management, University of Antwerp. Her research interests include intrahousehold resource 
allocation, gender budgeting, gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation. 
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 agency’ and broader societal changes in terms of gender relations. Conclusions may also 
differ as a result of diverging research methodologies or opposing subjective 
interpretations of nevertheless similar findings. Another possible explanatory factor for 
the conflicting evidence observed is that programs which are classified as similar may in 
fact contain crucial differences that are ultimately responsible for diverging outcomes.  
Many microfinance programs are similar in that they share two features, namely the 
borrower’s gender and the lending technology applied. Indeed, in a 1998 survey of their 
925 member institutions, the Microcredit Summit Council of Practitioners reported that 
about seventy-six per cent of the clients are women. As regards lending technology, many 
microfinance programs involve a kind of group intermediation between the lender and the 
borrower. While both features may clearly pay off in terms of a program’s financial 
profitability, they are also often legitimized on ‘equity’ and ‘empowerment’ grounds. 
This article takes a closer look at the empowerment potential of schemes whereby credit 
is targeted at women through group intermediation, and essentially argues that it is 
shortsighted to believe group intermediation will invariably lead to a sustainable 
realization of this potential. It tries to trace back divergent outcomes to particular 
program features and explores the underlying mechanisms through which effects are 
achieved. I draw on insights from (critical) institutional and feminist economics and 
confront these with findings from my own South India case study. The empirical 
evidence dates back to the late 1990s, but remains relevant in the current era of the new 
aid paradigm3, which attaches great importance to the ‘poverty reduction strategies’ 
(PRSs) recipient countries need to spell out in so-called ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers’ (PRSPs) in order to be eligible for aid. A closer look at a random sample of 10 of 
the 34 PRSPs from countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin 
America4 reveals that microfinance schemes figure high on most of these low-income 
countries’ development agendas, irrespective of their geographical location. Various 
PRSPs describe how market failures in the supply of ‘mainstream’ financial services 
towards the (rural) poor have prompted the emergence and rapid expansion of 
microfinance services in their societies. Interestingly, while most of the PRSPs 
underscore the potentials of microfinance, they simultaneously point at the urgency of 
closer supervision, regulation, monitoring and assessment of the impact of microfinance 
schemes in order to improve their effectiveness. It is against the latter setting that this 
article stresses the importance of an in-depth debate on appropriate lending technologies. 
The very immediate contribution of the research findings and ensuing debate is to help 
decision-makers in designing credit programs that are more likely to yield an 
empowering outcome while reducing possible adverse effects.  
 
Group intermediation: instrumentalist versus transformatory use 
In their quest to make the poor ‘bankable’, microfinance institutions have, over 
time, developed mechanisms that can cope with transaction and information costs. These 
costs are assumed to be particularly high when lending small amounts to a widely 
scattered population of poor. In this context, group intermediation has been strongly 
propagated, as it increases the likelihood of repayment through peer pressure and takes 
care of a number of elementary but highly time-consuming aspects of loan proceedings. 
While the beneficial effects of group intermediation on the transaction and information 
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 costs incurred by microfinance programs are well known and extensively researched 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Huppi and Feder, 1990; Sharma and Zeller, 1997), far less 
attention has been devoted to the possibly beneficial role of gender norms in terms of 
financial profitability. Notable exceptions are Goetz and Sen Gupta (1994) and Yaqub 
(1995), who have showcased that, in societies characterized by highly skewed and strictly 
applied gender norms, the risk of non-repayment may be reduced by lending to women, 
as norms of obedience and compliance make them less likely to default. Numerous are 
the examples of women who, in order to avoid incurring the cost of shame due to non-
repayment, choose to sacrifice their own well-being or that of their families.  
It is particularly with regard to their interaction with the socio-cultural construct of 
gender that one may distinguish between different group-based credit programs targeted 
at women. While all these schemes can seem very similar on the surface–sharing a 
similar rhetoric about the importance of women’s empowerment–their underlying 
rationale, conceptualization and impact appear to diverge substantially when assessed 
through a broader societal ‘gender’ lens. Notwithstanding the explanatory potential of a 
broader evaluation perspective, whereby the focus shifts from the individual and the 
household to a more general societal level, this approach remains underexposed in 
practice.   
In what follows, I broadly distinguish between an “instrumentalist” and a 
“transformatory” use of women’s groups (Molyneux, 1985). The former approach, 
deliberately or otherwise, essentially applies group intermediation and existing patterns 
of gendered behavior to enhance financial sustainability, while the latter primarily uses 
credit as a means to mobilize women into groups and to stimulate collective action that 
may contribute to the transformation of gender relations themselves. There are, at 
present, no overview studies that provide a reliable account of the respective prevalence 
of instrumentalist and transformatory group intermediation. However, one can easily 
imagine that microfinance programs, where financial profitability criteria come into play, 
will usually be reluctant to fundamentally upset gender norms that serve their purpose so 
well. Even if they do not deliberately build upon existing gendered socio-economic and 
political processes, and indeed may sometimes explicitly disapprove of such processes, it 
is not surprising that most microfinance schemes strive towards changes in women’s 
status that do not fundamentally challenge underlying societal gender norms. In practice, 
such programs will tend to limit their efforts to ‘safe’, ‘non-challenging’, interventions. 
This essentially means that they usually focus on women’s ‘practical gender interests’5, 
including facilitating their access to a variety of production resources that may help them 
fulfill their ascribed tasks and roles, though without calling into question the ‘gendered’ 
division of those tasks and roles as such. Transformatory forms of intermediation diverge 
from this instrumentalist view of 'gender'. Their final objective is rather to work on 
‘strategic gender interests’, to enhance change in the underlying gender relations, using 
credit and the promotion of practical gender interests as an entry point and mobilization 
strategy.  
To gain a better understanding of the underlying processes involved in the strongly 
divergent gendered effects of instrumentalist and transformatory approaches to women’s 
groups as intermediaries in credit schemes, I rely on contributions in the fields of 
(critical) institutional and feminist economics6. They offer illuminating insights into such 
aspects as gender, institutional change and collective action that are readily applicable to 
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 the issue at hand. More specifically, an institutional economics perspective can help us 
understand how a socio-cultural construct such as ‘gender’ can be instrumental in 
reducing transaction and information costs in microfinance programs and in making the 
poor ‘bankable’. Conversely, it can shed light on the instrumental role ‘credit’ may play 
in triggering collective action by women’s groups with a view to achieving change in the 
underlying gender relations.  
 
Gender, collective action and institutional change 
Particularly interesting for analyzing the issues at stake are the differences between 
institutional economics and mainstream neoclassical economics in terms of their 
conceptualization of driving forces behind human development. While neoclassical 
economics considers human behavior mainly to be the result of free human agency, 
institutional economics lends more credibility to the autonomous influence of norms and 
institutions, without however taking the pendulum too far in the other direction. It tries to 
refrain from downplaying the role of norms, while not lending credence either to the 
diametrically opposed view that human beings are fully molded by independent and 
immovable norms and institutions and therefore have no room to ‘maneuver’. 
Institutional economics rather attempts to take the golden mean, picturing human 
behavior as the result of free human agency, norms and institutions, and how they 
interact. As Folbre (1995, p. 81) puts it: “institutionalist economics treats norms, 
preferences and values as partially endogenous, and asks how they evolve. It also takes 
collective action seriously, asking how people may come to identify with, and pursue 
common interests within social groups”. While such an approach adds complexity to the 
mainstream neoclassical view, it is particularly valuable for (mainly feminist) researchers 
and practitioners, as it provides insight into the ‘autonomous’ influence on human 
behavior of a socio-cultural construct such as ‘gender’. Additionally, it helps explain its 
persistency, while also pointing at its ‘changeability’ in the longer term, and even 
suggesting ways of triggering such change. Although this research and policy agenda is 
far from complete, there have been some valuable contributions from a ‘feminist 
economics’ perspective by such authors as Agarwal (1994), Folbre (1994, 1995) and 
Kabeer (1994).  
The above authors argue that ‘gender’, similarly to other norms and rules, defines 
the realm of choice. In making human behavior predictable, ‘gender’ reduces the 
transaction/coordination costs involved in human interaction. For example, the mere fact 
that ‘gender’ determines, to varying degrees, which tasks men and women ‘are supposed 
to perform’ reduces the time individual men and women need to spend on day-to-day 
bargaining over time and task allocation. Moreover, the particular nature of a socio-
cultural construct such as gender makes its enforcement relatively easy. As norms and 
rules relating to gender are shared by the community to which one belongs, disobedience 
leads to disapproval and, in some cases, to expulsion from that community. If norms are 
strongly internalized, as tends to be the case with gender, external sanctions are also less 
essential, as deviation as such already gives rise to an internal cost of ‘shame’ (Elster, 
1989).  Aside from the ‘economizing’ function of reducing costs of transaction and 
enforcement, ‘gender’ obviously also serves a redistributive purpose. It regulates 
conflicts between social groups and, more specifically, sets out the parameters for the 
distribution of the fruits of cooperation between men and women. As Folbre puts it 
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 (1994, p. 65), “structures of constraint based on gender are unfair if they restrict women’s 
choices more than men’s, or give men an a priori advantage either in terms of rights or 
responsibilities. Cleary, such structures vary over space and across time, and some are 
more unfair that others”. She further indicates (p. 7) that “the tendency of powerful 
groups to exploit others, to seek collective ‘rents’, ‘surplus’, or ‘tribute’ that exceed the 
value of the coordination they provide, is a destabilizing factor that provides incentives 
for the less powerful groups to organize against them”.  
Insights into how less powerful groups are able to defy and modify the structures of 
constraint are particularly relevant to the present research context. While institutional 
changes, certainly in relation to such a strongly internalized construct as gender, are 
clearly not easy to realize, history has indeed shown that women (in particular) have been 
able to defy and redefine 'gender', especially when acting together. This holds for 
industrialized as well as developing countries. Agarwal (1994), Kabeer (1995) and Moser 
(1993) all provide convincing evidence of women’s groups that operate as powerful 
‘institutional entrepreneurs’, challenging and weakening the application of traditional 
gender norms and expanding the domain of free human choice.  
Collective action on the basis of collective interests has indeed been identified by 
institutional theory as one of the powerful mechanisms for inducing change to existing 
institutions (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). Notwithstanding this potential, the occurrence of 
group action to serve common interests is not easily explained in terms of individual 
rationality. This is essentially due to the kind of goods that are produced through 
collective action. More often than not, they may be classified as ‘public goods’, whose 
consumption and benefits are not readily restricted to those who invested time and 
resources in their production. It is, for instance, clear to see that changes to gender norms 
realized through actions undertaken by women’s groups and movements can also benefit 
women (and men) who did not participate in those actions. To the extent that individual 
women are aware of this, it is rational for them not to invest time and resources in 
campaigning and collective action, and to wait instead for others to act on their behalf. If, 
however, every individual were to adopt this attitude, then collective action would simply 
fail to materialize. The question therefore arises how this ‘tragedy of the commons’ may 
be overcome. This is particularly relevant from the perspective of ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’ who greatly value the benefits of changes in gender and who would invest 
in it at any cost. For them, it is crucially important to succeed in motivating a ‘critical 
mass’ of individuals in order to achieve effective collective action. 
One way to attract individuals is through ‘selective incentives’. By this we mean 
goods or services that can be made available to individual persons who do participate 
(while at the same time excluding those that do not participate) and may thus trigger 
collective action as a kind of by-product (Olson, 1982). Credit, for instance, clearly has 
the potential to act as a ‘selective incentive’ for women to become involved in women’s 
groups. However, collective action for changes in more deeply entrenched gender norms 
(strategic gender needs) will not materialize automatically. It is essential in this respect 
that a social intermediary function should be built upon the mechanism of financial 
intermediation7. By creating a forum for the sharing of everyday life experiences, women 
may come to realize that most of their experiences are ‘collective’ rather than 
‘individual’, and they may gradually become aware of a link between their own condition 
of ‘relative deprivation’ and broader socio-economic structures. This will essentially lead 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 7 #4 May 2006 40 
 to the ‘collectivization’ of individual problems and to the unveiling of such underlying 
structural causes as ‘gender’. On this basis, and essentially depending upon the 
organizational effectiveness of the group, common strategic gender interests may be 
identified and remedying collective action initiated.  As Kabeer puts it (1994, p. 253, my 
emphasis): “recognition of the shared aspects (my emphasis) of subordination points to 
its collectively enforced, and hence collectively changeable, character and forms the basis 
of strategies for change. …. Given women’s disenfranchisement from most sources of 
institutional power, their collective strength is seen as the most important transformatory 
resource at their disposal.” Furthermore, she vividly points out that, in order for the 
transformatory potential to be realized, it is important that the “organizational capacity” 
of women’s groups and associations should be strengthened and that alliances between 
them should emerge. Networking into larger federations and movements will also 
increase the ‘perceived’ effectiveness in the eyes of the constituting women’s group and 
individuals, which will in turn enhance the probability of collective action being 
undertaken successfully (Opp, 1989).  
 
Learning from the field 
 
Data and methodology 
The theoretical insights highlighted above are confirmed by empirical work. In my 
own research, this was the case in a microfinance impact study conducted towards the 
end of the 1990s in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu (Holvoet, 1999). In this study, I 
compared the impact of five credit programs that used slightly different lending 
technologies on various indicators of women’s and girls’ status at individual, household 
and community level.   
In the context of the present article, I focus mainly on a comparison of the impact 
that two of the five credit programs had on local gender norms. The two programs 
selected are highly similar in that they are both part of a larger project, i.e. the Tamil 
Nadu Women’s Development Program (TNWDP). This project took off in 1990 and 
provides credit to women below the poverty line. It is innovative in that it cooperates 
simultaneously with banks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in channeling 
loans to poor women who are members of women’s groups. The NGOs are mainly 
responsible for the organization and follow-up of the women’s groups. They essentially 
provide training in technical, managerial and financial aspects, as well as in leadership 
skills, and organize awareness-raising activities relating to gender and social 
development issues. NGOs operating in the region are the Mysore Resettlement and 
Development Agency (Myrada) and the Rural Integrated Development Organization 
(Rido). While both organizations provide social development services as convened under 
the TNWDP, Myrada’s better-developed organizational and management structure, 
combined with its broader financial base, allows it to invest much more substantially in 
the accumulation of human resources and social capital by the marginalized population. 
Training materials provided under the TNWDP are largely based on input from Myrada, 
and Myrada has also assisted some of the smaller NGOs involved in the TNWDP. 
Myrada’s philosophy is clearly to use credit as an entry point for mobilizing women into 
groups and ultimately to transform these groups into agents of local institutional change. 
In order to achieve this objective, Myrada adopts a gradual approach of individual and 
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 group capacity building, including training on financial, organizational and managerial 
issues and awareness-raising activities related to gender and broader social development 
issues. Groups are monitored and graded and, through the ‘linkage project’, ‘strong’ 
groups are encouraged to interact with local decision-making bodies and institutions such 
as village councils (panchayats), dairy cooperatives, village health committees, teacher 
parent associations and banks.  
In order to be able to compare the impact of Rido- and Myrada-organized credit 
groups on selected local gender norms, and to gain insight into the underlying 
mechanisms, I complemented data from secondary sources with primary data collection, 
and combined qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Information was gathered at 
different levels. Data on individual and household-level application of gender norms were 
collected mostly in 1997 by means of a quasi-experimental impact study. The structured 
survey consisted in individual interviews that I took from samples of 50 Rido and 50 
Myrada group members randomly selected from the total population of Rido and Myrada 
group members who joined the groups at the very beginning of the project (1990) and 
who obtained their first loan in 1990-1. Interviewees were questioned about their actual 
(1997) application of gender norms as well as about what they remembered from their 
behavior prior to group membership (1990). This recall information complemented the 
1990 database that was available from the NGOs. For obvious reasons, information 
relating to the 1997 period is more reliable than that relating to the 1990 period. In order 
to better understand these survey findings, particularly the observation of diverging 
effects of different credit programs, the study also tried to gain insight into the two 
programs’ effect on and interaction with the broader community level. In this respect, it 
relied mainly upon findings from semi-structured interviews with 21 women’s groups 
and open interviews with non-sample key respondents. Obviously, my continuous 
residence over a period of five months in a non-sample village within the geographical 
area of the research also provided me with valuable insights.  
As we know from various other studies, credit impact assessment can suffer from 
serious methodological flaws that make it difficult to distinguish true program effects 
from all kinds of competing and extraneous explanations that clearly compromise the 
validity of the research results8. It is important, for example, to establish just how similar 
the programs are in terms of every possible characteristic (except of course for the 
specific aspect whose differential impact you intend to ascertain), and to attract 
individuals with similar backgrounds and located in similar settings, who have not 
experienced too many extraneous events that might impact differently on the aspect under 
study. As mentioned above, Myrada and Rido schemes are part of a larger project, which 
makes them quite similar, except for the (necessarily) different approach to the role of 
women’s groups. Whereas Rido considers these groups mainly as financial 
intermediaries, Myrada strongly emphasizes social intermediation and invests heavily in 
their role as institutional ‘entrepreneurs’. Scrutiny of all villages where Myrada and Rido 
groups operate further revealed that these communities are very similar in terms of size 
and location, and interviews with non-sample respondents showed that none of the 
villages had experienced specific events that might have influenced patterns of local 
gender norms differently. Interviews with staff of NGOs and banks involved in the 
region, as well as the membership records kept at the NGOs, suggest there was no reason 
to believe Myrada and Rido attracted or selected women with diverging background 
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 characteristics. As is clear from Table 1, and as will be discussed in due course, this was 
to a large extent also confirmed by data from individual interviews. In order to avoid as 
much as possible any contamination of research conclusions due to spill-over effects 
from one program to the other, Myrada and Rido groups were selected exclusively from 
villages where no other women’s groups were operating.  
In addition to problems of internal validity, the research setup also takes due 
account of possible construct validity issues with respect to ‘gender norms’, the 
dependent variable under study. Gender is a socio-cultural construct whose manifestation 
clearly varies over time and space. Consequently, close attention needed to be paid to an 
appropriate selection of locally relevant areas of ‘gendered’ behavior. In this respect, the 
study relied on a literature review and on in-depth interviews with non-sample key 
persons during the two preliminary testing phases of the research project in 1994 and 
1996. Column I in Table 1 provides an overview of the six important areas of gendered 
behavior that were identified, i.e. ‘female mobility’, ‘choice of marriage partner’, 
‘practice of dowry’, ‘female inheritance’, ‘female seclusion’, ‘female control over 
resources’. For each of these areas, respondents were asked to identify behavior that was 
considered locally to be ‘the norm’, as well as to indicate and rank locally relevant forms 
of ‘deviant behavior’. These were subsequently used as possible response categories in 
the individual interviews with the two sub-samples of 50 randomly selected Myrada and 
Rido group members. In order to grasp in a single figure all the information contained in 
frequency distributions, I also constructed an ‘index of gender norm application’ for each 
of the areas under consideration. In this manner, and on the basis of the interviews with 
non-sample key respondents, scores were assigned to each of the response categories for 
degree of gender norm application. Subsequently, indices were constructed by adding 
together the percentage distributions of each response category multiplied by the score 
assigned to that response category, and by then dividing this sum by 100 multiplied by 
the highest score assigned to a response category. This yields scores ranging from zero to 
one, with a zero-score indicating ‘complete absence of application of local gender norms’ 
and a score of ‘one’ signifying ‘full compliance with local gender norms’. While I 
deliberately avoided using the notion of ‘empowerment’ during the interviews, various 
respondents explicitly indicated that ‘the index of gender norm application’ could also be 
interpreted as ‘an index of empowerment’ (with descending scores for increasing levels 
of empowerment).    
 
Findings and analysis 
Table 1 provides an overview for both sub-samples of the degree of application of 
selected gender norms in 1990 and in 1997. T-test results are summarized at the bottom 
of the table. As we have previously mentioned, little difference was observed between 
Myrada and Rido members before group membership. Very similar patterns emerge from 
a comparison of columns II and III. In 1990, both groups practiced the same norms more 
strictly (i.e. ‘arranged marriage’; ‘giving and asking of dowry’), and they were also least 
compliant with other, related, norms (i.e. ‘female seclusion’, ‘restricted female 
mobility’). These observations are not particularly surprising and confirm information 
obtained from other sources: while the former norms are strongly and increasingly 
applied throughout Indian society, there is ample evidence of an inverse relationship 
between the socio-economic status of households and the application of norms of female 
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 seclusion and restricted female mobility. As several of the respondents explicitly 
mentioned, the cost of keeping women indoors is just too high for households living 
below the poverty line. Several women actually reported that they had almost been forced 
by their husbands to become members of a women’s group, even if those same husbands 
were wary of the fact that this would necessitate a much greater involvement of their 
wives in public life. Obviously, credit had served as a kind of selective incentive, 
particularly towards husbands who considered their wives’ membership of a women’s 
group as ‘a necessary evil’ in order to gain access to ‘cheap’ credit.  
  
Table 1. Overview of application of local gender norms by Myrada and Rido 
members (1990 and 1997) 
I. 
 














 Status in 1990(a) Status in 1997(b)
Female Mobility 
% freely move (=0) 
% need to be accompanied (=1) 


















Choice of Marriage Partner  
% love marriage (=0) 
% arranged marriage (=1)  

















Practice of Dowry 
% no giving, no asking (=0) 
% giving (=1) 
% asking (and giving) (=2)  





















Female Inheritance  
% equal inheritance (=0)  
% other things beside jewelry(=1) 
% only jewelry (=2) 



























% outside work (=0) 
% work in own family field (=1) 






















Female Control over Resources 
% assets in own name (=0) 
% assets in both names (=1) 
% assets only in men’s name(=2) 
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 (a) Results of two-sided independent samples t-test indicate that null-hypothesis of no 
statistically significant differences between Myrada and Rido members before group 
membership was rejected at 5% level for ‘practice of dowry’ (absolute t-value: 2.049) 
and ‘female inheritance’ (2.477).  
(b) Results of two-sided independent samples t-test indicate that null-hypothesis of no 
statistically significant differences between Myrada and Rido members in 1997 was 
rejected at the 1% level for ‘female mobility’ (3.552); ‘practice of dowry’ (9.259); 
‘female inheritance’ (3.315) and ‘female control over resources’ (3.567).  
(c) Results of two-sided paired samples t-test indicate that null-hypothesis of no 
statistically significant differences between Myrada members before/after was rejected at 
the 1% level for ‘female mobility’ (4.365); ‘choice of marriage partner’ (2.824); ‘practice 
of dowry’ (9.137); ‘female inheritance’ (12.833); ‘female seclusion’ (3.280); ‘female 
control over resources’ (12.476).  
(d) Results of two-sided paired samples t-test indicate that null-hypothesis of no 
statistically significant differences between Rido members before/after was rejected at the 
1% level for ‘female mobility’ (2.824); ‘practice of dowry’ (3.070); ‘female inheritance’ 
(2.824); ‘female seclusion’ (2.852); ‘female control over resources’ (7.180).  
 
Whereas credit and financial intermediation were clearly effective in mobilizing 
women into the public arena, thereby reducing female seclusion, the impact of women’s 
group membership on the application of other gender norms certainly diverges from 
program to program. In cases where the objective was financial intermediation, as in 
Rido groups, effects were clearly much weaker than in cases also involving major 
investment in the group’s social intermediation function. This is evident from the data 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 (comparison of columns IV and V) shows that, after 
seven years of group membership, Myrada group members generally apply all gender 
norms much less strictly than Rido members. T-test results indicate that, in 1997, 
differences between both groups were statistically significant at the 1-percent level for 
‘female mobility’, ‘practice of dowry’, ‘female inheritance’ and ‘female control over 
resources’. In practice, Myrada members could move more freely, they were more likely 
to receive a fair share of an inheritance and to hold assets in their own name. In many 
cases, they even succeeded in convincing their husbands not to practice dowry. 
Acceptance of love marriages involving their own children, however, was still very 
unusual in all households.   
Whereas Rido members also appeared to have applied gender norms less strictly in 
1997 than in 1990 (which is evident from column III in table 1 and from the results of 
paired sample t-tests as reported below Table 1), the differential impact calculations 
(using both simple and proportional formula) reported on in Table 2 clearly indicate that 
effects of Myrada membership were much greater than those of Rido membership9.  
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 Table 2: Overview of before/after scores and differential impact scores of Myrada 
and Rido group membership 
IV. 
























Female mobility index - 0.280  -0.140 -0.140 -0.390 
Choice of marriage 
partner index 
-0.140 -0.020 -0.120 -0.130 
Practice of dowry 
index 
-0.620 -0.110 -0.510 -0.704 
Female inheritance 
index 
-0.420 -0.093 -0.327 -0.444 
Female seclusion 
index 
-0.150 -0.110 -0.040 0 
Female control over 
resources index 
-0.740 -0.450 -0.290 -0.325 
(a)= Myrada after score – Myrada before score 
(b)= Rido after score – Rido before score  
(c)= (Myrada after score – Myrada before score) – (Rido after score - Rido before 
score)10 
(d)=[(Myrada after score-Myrada before score)/Myrada before score] – [(Rido after 
score-Rido before score)/Rido before score]  
 
In order to assess the causes of divergent effects, I essentially relied upon data from 
interviews with women’s groups and non-sample key respondents. In sum, these 
interviews revealed that changes at the individual and household level were primarily 
linked to a differential interaction with the community. Myrada’s gradual approach of 
personal and organizational capacity-building, and particularly its linkage project, had 
firmly pushed groups into the public arena, which clearly paid off subsequently at the 
individual and household level. More specifically, Myrada groups gradually became 
more closely involved in various kinds of more heterogeneous public decision-making 
bodies, including the local panchayats (village councils), dairy cooperatives, forest and 
watershed committees, and teacher parent associations. By engaging in extra-household 
bargaining at the community level, women’s groups impregnated local public arenas of 
economic, social and political decision-making which had until then been closed to men 
as well as women of their class and caste. By networking with other women’s groups in 
the region, intermediaries even held regional authorities accountable for service delivery 
and quality. As a result, women’s groups were, deliberately or not, increasingly 
considered to be genuine agents of local institutional change. Obviously, these successes 
and experiences in collective bargaining strongly influenced the ‘perceived’ effectiveness 
of their collective action and changed the ‘perceived’ costs and benefits of engaging in 
more challenging actions at the level of local gender norms.  
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 Over time, as the realization grew that the problems they encountered were often 
similar, women became increasingly aware of the role of gender, forcefully impinging on 
human behavior and interaction. They also began to recognize that action was necessary 
at this more overarching societal level if sustainable change was to be realized at the 
individual and household level. While some of these changes, including increased 
visibility of women in the public arena, were ‘silently’ and almost automatically 
achieved, Myrada women’s groups gradually also engaged purposefully in collective 
action over local gender norms. They were particularly proud of the stance they had taken 
against the practice of dowry. Several women, members and non-members, explicitly 
acknowledged that changes at the broader community level, which had been induced by 
women’s groups, had impacted on their own individual lives, as is also apparent from the 
data presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the ‘empowerment’ potential of microfinance programs through the lens 
of institutional and feminist economics helps us understand the differential outcomes of 
seemingly very similar programs whereby credit is targeted at women through group 
intermediation. It essentially unwinds the much debated ‘empowerment’ potential of 
credit in terms of the capacity it has to serve as a selective incentive for bringing women 
together. Credit delivery channels, especially if involving investment in social 
intermediation, can evolve towards genuine agents of local institutional change. 
Particularly important in the light of realizing the ‘empowerment’ potential are the 
marginal changes that collective action by women’s groups may provoke at the level of 
‘gender’ as such, one of the most persistent and impregnating sets of norms governing 
human behavior and interaction. Changes at this overarching societal level in particular 
push forward substantial and sustainable changes in women’s status at the individual and 
household level.  
Notwithstanding the transformatory potential of credit in this respect, most 
mainstream microfinance programs tend to operate inversely, using women’s groups 
merely as financial intermediaries, and thus increasing individual programs’ financial 
profitability. From an organizational point of view, the choice to leave credit’s more 
radical gender-related transformatory potentialities unexploited is not a surprising one. In 
fact it is rational, given that program officers are increasingly held accountable within a 
narrowly defined notion of ‘efficiency’. Yet it would appear to be entirely justified to 
move away from a purely financial and individual program perspective to a more 
economic and societal interpretation of ‘efficiency’. Widely documented evidence of an 
‘efficiency dividend’ flowing from women’s empowerment11 provides a strong argument 
for attributing much greater weight to an individual program's contribution to 
empowerment. Acknowledging the higher costs incurred by programs that invest in social 
intermediation, group capacity building and networking, policymakers may wish to 
consider the appropriateness of financially rewarding individual lending organizations for 
the beneficial spill-over effects generated.  
 
Notes  
1. For a discussion of microfinance and empowerment in Africa, see Mayoux (1999).   
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 7 #4 May 2006 47 
 2. For a positive account, see among others Hashemi and Schuler (1994), Amin et al. 
(1998) and Zaman (2000).  For evidence of adverse effects, see among others Lessinger 
(1990), Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996), Rahman (1998).  
3. In recent years, a shift has occurred in the type of aid instruments that are deemed 
appropriate for low-income countries. More specifically, an evolution has unfolded from 
a project-based to a more program-oriented approach to aid. Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs), i.e. (recipient) country-produced policy documents that set out 
macroeconomic and social policies aimed at tackling poverty, are the linchpin of a new 
approach that stresses long-term and holistic vision, broad-based country ownership 
(participation of both governmental and non-governmental actors such as civil society), 
results orientation and country-led partnership.  
4. The 10 countries are (in alphabetical order): Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Sri Lanka, Zambia.  
5. On the difference between ‘strategic’ and ‘practical gender interests’, see Molyneux 
(1985). 
6. See, for instance, Agarwal (1994), Folbre (1994,1995), Kabeer (1994), Mc Crate 
(1987), Seiz (1995). 
7. See Edgcomb and Barton (1998) for an overview of literature on social intermediation 
and microfinance programs.  
8. For an overview of all potential threats to validity of research conclusions and for 
possible remedies, see Campbell and Cook (1979).  
9. The focus of this article is on ‘differential’ impact, not on the ‘net’ impact of the two 
credit programs. Making inferences about net impact would necessitate a comparison of 
each of the credit program households with a control group of households who received 
no credit.   
10. See Mohr (1992, p. 88-90) on simple gain score and proportional gain score analysis.   
11. For evidence, see among others World Bank (2001). 
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